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Abstract: ‘Virtue signaling’ is the practice of using moral talk in order to enhance one’s moral 
reputation. Many find this kind of behavior irritating. However, some philosophers have gone 
further, arguing that virtue signaling actively undermines the proper functioning of public moral 
discourse and impedes moral progress. Against this view, I argue that widespread virtue 
signaling is not a social ill, and that it can actually serve as an invaluable instrument for moral 
change, especially in cases where moral argument alone does not suffice. Specifically, virtue 
signaling can change the broader public’s social expectations, which can in turn motivate the 
adoption of new, positive social norms. I also argue that the reputation-seeking motives 
underlying virtue signaling impose important constraints on virtue signalers’ behavior, which 
serve to keep the worst excesses of virtue signaling in check. 
1. Introduction 
Virtue signaling is the act of engaging in public moral discourse in order to enhance or preserve 
one’s moral reputation.1 Typical examples of virtue signaling might include an individual 
making a social media post vehemently condemning some offensive action taken by a public 
figure, or a brand launching a marketing campaign that invokes themes of social justice. What 
makes the act in question an instance of virtue signaling is not the content of the moral 
expression itself, but rather the status-seeking desires of the person or corporate entity making it. 
 
1 James Bartholomew, “Easy Virtue,” The Spectator, April 18, 2015; David Shariatmadari, “‘Virtue Signalling’ the 
Putdown That Has Passed Its Sell by Date,” The Guardian, January 20, 2016. 
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One engages in virtue signaling in the hopes of seeing one’s moral reputation improve in the 
eyes of one’s peers (or potential customers); the desire to make a constructive, sincere 
contribution to public moral discourse is at best a secondary motivation.2  
It is easy to see why ‘virtue signaling’ is a pejorative term, and why many find it annoying. But 
for some, the prospect of widespread virtue signaling represents something much darker. 
Recently, philosophers Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke have argued that virtue signaling (or, as 
they call it, moral grandstanding3) is not just irritating, but actively harmful to the proper 
functioning of public moral discourse itself, such that it impairs our collective ability to improve 
our moral beliefs and promote positive moral changes in the world.4 When contributions to 
public debate are driven by status-seeking goals, these authors argue, this leads to a series of 
increasingly inflated moral claims, exaggerated expressions of outrage, and aggressive piling on 
and public shaming. This causes onlookers to disengage from moral discourse, either because of 
increased cynicism about their would-be interlocutors’ motives, increased political polarization, 
or sheer exhaustion. In short, when the sphere of public moral discourse ceases to be a forum for 
 
2 The internal, psychological nature of virtue signaling makes it difficult to determine whether a given act of moral 
speech is a case of virtue signaling. This makes the empirical study of virtue signaling and its real-world effects 
challenging. It also means that the term is prone to false accusations. Indeed, one might legitimately worry that the 
label ‘virtue signaling’ can be used to silence or undermine legitimate moral concerns, which would be a form of 
testimonial injustice; see Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). For the purposes of this paper, I am setting these undeniably problematic cases aside, and 
am focusing solely upon instances of genuine, status-seeking virtue signaling. 
3 Tosi and Warmke use the technical term ‘moral grandstanding’ because they see the term ‘virtue signaling’ as 
politically charged and prone to certain misunderstandings; see Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke, Grandstanding: 
The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 37–40. However, their definition of 
moral grandstanding coincides with the commonsense understanding of ‘virtue signaling,’ and so it is reasonable to 
treat the two terms as synonymous, even if they have slightly different connotations. Since it is more widely 
understood, I have chosen to use ‘virtue signaling’ in this paper; see also Neil Levy, “Virtue Signalling Is Virtuous,” 
Synthese, 2020, 1–18. 
4 Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke, “Moral Grandstanding,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 44, no. 3 (2016): 197–
217; Tosi and Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk. 
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the sincere exchange of moral ideas and turns into an arena for competitive moralizing, it just 
stops working.5  
In this paper, I offer a defense of virtue signaling and its role in public moral discourse. While it 
may not be particularly praiseworthy or noble, I will argue virtue signaling is also not something 
that should be actively discouraged, nor should we think of it a dangerous social ill. Rather, 
virtue signaling and the status-seeking motives behind it should be viewed as neutral, stable 
features of the social environment that function as vehicles for the diffusion of social norms. Far 
from standing in the way of moral progress, understanding virtue signaling this way actually 
reveals how it can serve as an invaluable tool for positive social change. I will also argue that 
certain reliable features of human psychology – our epistemic and moral vigilance – create social 
constraints against excessive virtue signaling, limiting the potential for vicious spirals of the sort 
that might lead to widespread hypocrisy and cynicism. In short, virtue signaling is no great threat 
to the integrity of public moral discourse, and if we correctly understand its relation to social 
norms, it can even serve as an instrument for positive moral change.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section two, I discuss how we should understand the 
relationship between moral discourse and moral progress. In section three, I provide the 
conception of social norms that will underlie my key positive claims about virtue signaling. In 
section four, I discuss how, in light of this conception of social norms, one would need to go 
about changing them. In section five, I show how virtue signaling can play a role in this process. 
Sections six and seven further defend virtue signaling by addressing worries about its potential 
harms, and outline some of the practical and epistemic constraints on the contents of virtue 
 
5 Tosi and Warmke do not deny that virtue signaling might occasionally have positive moral and social 
consequences, but they view these positive effects as incidental and vastly outweighed by more negative ones; see 
Tosi and Warmke, “Moral Grandstanding”; Tosi and Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk. 
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signals. Section eight addresses concerns about the potential for virtue signaling to contribute to 
moral and political polarization. Section nine responds to the worry that the moral progress 
wrought by virtue signaling and norm change is too thin by arguing that widespread shifts in 
social norms can precipitate deeper changes at the level of a community’s moral values. 
2. Public moral discourse and moral progress 
Going forward, my focus will be on the way that virtue signaling affects the proper functioning 
of public moral discourse. As such, I accept Tosi and Warmke’s claim that public moral 
discourse is supposed ‘to improve people’s moral beliefs, or to spur moral improvement in the 
world.6’ However, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the different ways that public moral 
discourse might promote these ends. One very natural way of thinking about this process is to 
understand it in epistemic, deliberative terms: moral talk exposes us to new moral arguments, 
which leads to improvements in people’s moral beliefs, which in turn motivates moral action and 
good consequences. When deciding whether to take part in a protest or to support a particular 
policy, for example, agents can visit the public square, weigh the moral reasons being presented 
on all sides of the debate in question, and then act based on what they take to be the most 
compelling arguments. Because the arguments presented in the public square are sincere 
attempts by epistemically responsible agents to arrive at moral truth, this process provides us 
with an overall reliable procedure for achieving moral progress. This epistemic, deliberative 
conception of public moral discourse seems to be what Tosi and Warmke have in mind in their 
arguments against virtue signaling: because their moral claims are driven by a desire for status 
rather than a desire for truth, virtue signalers cause the contents of moral discourse to become 
 
6 Tosi and Warmke, “Moral Grandstanding,” 209. 
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untethered from the reality, thereby undermining its epistemic integrity.7 According to this view, 
public moral discourse is supposed to help us reason our way to a better world, while virtue 
signaling blows us off-course. 
This epistemic conception of how moral talk contributes to moral progress is incomplete. As we 
shall see, the deliberative process envisioned by Tosi and Warmke often fails to spur moral 
progress, even when it succeeds in changing people’s moral beliefs. This is because many of the 
social practices that stand in the way of moral progress are not motivated by moral beliefs at all, 
but rather by the strong desire to conform to local norms.8 To get people to abandon these 
practices, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to change their moral beliefs: one must instead 
change the social beliefs that undergird their beliefs about what the people around them think 
and do. Public moral discourse can however function as a vehicle for conveying precisely this 
kind of social information, albeit not by the deliberative route that Tosi and Warmke envision. 
Instead, moral claims in the public square double as a source of evidence through which people 
are able to infer the norms of their local community. It is in this role that virtue signaling can 
serve as a means for moral progress: not as a source of evidence for moral beliefs, but as a vector 
for information about social norms.9  
3. Social norms 
 
7 See for example Tosi and Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk, 74–74, 90; see also Tosi 
and Warmke's responses in C.A.J. Coady, “Philosophy & Public Affairs Discussion at PEA Soup: Justin Tosi and 
Brandon Warmke’s ‘Moral Grandstanding,’” PEA Soup, 2017. 
8 For reviews of empirical work on this topic, see Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Cristina Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change 
Social Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
9 In his recent defense of virtue signaling, Neil Levy argues that virtue signaling can be defended on epistemic 
grounds as well, since virtue signaling can serve as higher-order evidence for our moral beliefs via expressions of 
confidence and social consensus. In section 7, I will give a different epistemic defense of virtue signaling, arguing 




Following Cristina Bicchieri,10 I define social norms as behavioral practices that individuals 
adopt conditional on certain beliefs about how other members of their community behave and 
think, or social expectations. Specifically, 
A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on 
condition that they believe that (a) most people in their reference network conform to it 
(empirical expectation), and (b) that most people in their reference network believe they 
ought to conform to it (normative expectation).11 
An individual’s reference network refers to the group of people whose behaviors and attitudes 
they care about when making various decisions. This group can change depending on the 
context, and the people in it need not be physically proximate (especially in the digital age). A 
reference network can include members of one’s local community, profession, political party, 
and so on.12 As will become important later when I discuss the diffusion of norms between 
different groups, a person can belong to many different reference networks.  
Social norm conformity depends upon two specific types of belief: beliefs about whether others 
in one’s reference network are conforming to a social norm, or empirical expectations¸ and 
 
10 Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society; Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social 
Norms. 
11 Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms, 35. This definition is meant 
as a rational reconstruction of how social norms work, rather than a literal description of the psychological 
mechanisms that underpin them (see also Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society, 3). However, several models of the 
mechanisms of social norm conformity do invoke social expectations similar to those that Bicchieri has in mind; see 
for example Matteo Colombo, “Two Neurocomputational Building Blocks of Social Norm Compliance,” Biology 
and Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2014): 71–88; Jordan E. Theriault, Liane Young, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, “The Sense of 
Should: A Biologically-Based Framework for Modeling Social Pressure,” Physics of Life Reviews 1 (2020): 1–37; 
Michael Tomasello, “The Moral Psychology of Obligation,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43, no. e56 (2019): 1–
58. For more on the cognitive foundations of social norms, see Kristin Andrews, “Naïve Normativity: The Social 
Foundation of Moral Cognition,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 1 (2020): 36–56; Daniel 
Kelly and Taylor Davis, “Social Norms and Human Normative Psychology,” Social Philosophy and Policy 35, no. 1 
(2018): 54–76. 
12 Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms, 14. 
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beliefs about whether others in one’s reference network think that the behavior in question ought 
to be followed (where the ‘ought’ in question is prescriptive, rather than merely prudential or 
predictive), or normative expectations. Normative expectations are usually accompanied by the 
belief that non-conformity will result in social sanctions, which enforce norm compliance, 
thereby stabilizing empirical expectations.13  
Bicchieri draws on a number of morally abhorrent examples of destructive social norms from 
around the world, including female genital mutilation and child marriage practices. But for our 
purposes, we can begin with a more familiar example: queuing. When one encounters a line of 
people waiting by a bus stop, one often ends up queuing up as well. What motivates queuing is 
not the belief that this is the only physically possible way to get on the bus: one could easily cut 
in front of everyone else once the bus arrives. Nor is queuing solely motivated by the fact that 
other people seem to be queuing (i.e. empirical expectations): if one thought that people just 
happened to have formed a line by chance, one would not see any reason to adopt that behavior. 
Likewise, one would not feel motivated to queue if one only had the normative expectation that 
everyone believed that one ought to queue (‘If nobody else is following the rules, why should 
I?’). It is rather the combination of one’s empirical and normative expectations that creates the 
motivation for queuing. Not only is everyone else queuing, but everyone else also thinks that you 
should queue too (and they might get angry if you don’t).  
Social norms thus pick out practices that are distinguished by the kinds of beliefs that move 
people to adopt them. Notably, these are not beliefs about the desirability or moral status of the 
 
13 Bicchieri distinguishes social norms from two other forms of social conformity: descriptive norms, which are 
motivated solely by empirical expectations (e.g. when one adopts a particular clothing style because others in one’s 
reference network do so as well), and customs, which are motivated by non-social, practical considerations that 
cause people to behave in broadly similar ways (e.g. using umbrellas in the rain).  
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action itself. We conform to normative social practices because we are motivated by our beliefs 
about what other people do and think about those practices, not what we ourselves think about 
them. This means that conformity to a social norm is consistent with a person’s viewing the 
prescribed behavior as distasteful, imprudent, or even morally objectionable. Indeed, it is even 
possible for a community to persist in following a social norm despite the fact that nobody 
actually thinks it is a good thing, provided that they all still hold the relevant social expectations 
about that behavior – a condition that Bicchieri calls pluralistic ignorance.14 
4. Changing social norms 
The psychological underpinnings of norm conformity make social norms resistant to change in 
the face of rational argument. If, for example, the reason that individuals in a community persist 
in marrying off their young daughters is because they fear the opprobrium or sideways glances of 
the other people in their reference network, then presenting those individuals with moral reasons 
to abandon the practice is unlikely to change their behavior. Indeed, a harmful social norm might 
persist even when the moral and rational arguments against it are well known and privately 
endorsed. In his book The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, Appiah argues that this 
was the case with the practice of dueling in 18th- and 19th-century Britain. 15 The legal, religious, 
and moral arguments against dueling had been long acknowledged among the social circles that 
practiced it. Yet dueling continued to persist because it was intimately tied with one’s reputation 
as a gentleman, a person of honor. Maintaining one’s honor (and acknowledging the honor of 
another) meant being willing to respond to insults with lethal force, while also risking one’s own 
life in the process. Gentlemen would participate in duels even when they knew that doing so was 
 
14 Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society, 15. 




foolish and immoral. To illustrate this, Appiah quotes from the will of a man written the night 
before he was killed in a duel: ‘In the first place, I commit my soul to Almighty God, in hopes of 
his mercy and pardon for the irreligious step I now (in compliance with the unwarrantable 
customs of this wicked world) place myself under the necessity of taking.’16 
What led to the eventual end of dueling, Appiah argues, was not the emergence of some 
newfound moral understanding among the populations in question: the relevant moral and 
rational considerations were always readily apparent. Instead, English gentlemen stopped dueling 
because it came to be viewed as vulgar and dishonorable, associated with a loss of respect among 
their peers. When dueling became ungentlemanly, the gentlemen stopped doing it. Interestingly, 
Appiah attributes the change in norms surrounding dueling in part to increasing democratization, 
literacy, and to newly available forums for public moral discourse: 
Newspaper comments and cartoons […] were of crucial significance in the changing 
response to the duel. The rise of the popular press and of working-class literacy made it 
increasingly clear – and, as democratic sentiment grew, increasingly unacceptable – that 
gentlemen were living outside the law. When dueling was an aristocratic practice known 
mostly only within the class of those who practiced it, there was no place for the attitudes 
of ordinary people to shape its honor world. The modern press brought all citizens of 
Britain into a single community of knowledge and evaluation.17 
The story Appiah tells in The Honor Code reflects the fact that dueling was a social norm in 
Bicchieri’s sense. The persistence of dueling did not depend upon individual beliefs about 
whether or not dueling was a good idea. It depended upon people’s empirical and normative 
 
16 Appiah, 36. 
17 Ibid, 38. 
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expectations. Accordingly, the end of dueling first required a change in normative expectations, 
not a change in beliefs surrounding the moral status of dueling. What made this change in 
normative expectations possible was the emergence of a new venue for public discourse, where 
gentlemanly duelists were rightly shamed and ridiculed. Appiah goes on to argue that analogous 
shifts in normative expectations or ‘honor codes’ precipitated moral revolutions surrounding 
footbinding in Ming Dynasty China and the abolition of slavery in the British Empire. The 
overarching lesson aligns with Bicchieri’s central prescriptive recommendation: to change social 
norms, moral arguments are not enough: one must target the social expectations that undergird 
them.18 
5. Virtue signaling communicates social expectations 
To see how this understanding of social norms is related to virtue signaling, we must consider 
the kind of information that virtue signalers communicate to their audience. Normally, we think 
of virtue signaling as an attempt by a speaker to convey information about their character and 
thereby improve their reputation. According to this common understanding, the primary 
intention of any act of virtue signaling is to convey information about the speaker. However, this 
information is not usually conveyed directly, for obvious reasons. Straightforwardly asserting 
one’s superior moral character is commonly viewed as evidence of one’s immodesty and would 
thus prove self-defeating as a way of proving to others that one is virtuous.19 Instead, the virtue 
signaler must attempt to convey information about their moral character indirectly, via 
information about how they think people ought to think and act. When a virtue signaler 
condemns a politician in harsh moral terms for taking donations from the oil industry, or 
 
18 Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms. 
19 G. F. Schueler, “Why Is Modesty a Virtue?,” Ethics 109, no. 4 (1999): 835–41. 
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demands that a company fire an executive who made a racist comment, or abstains from 
consuming meat and dairy in the name of animal rights, they are publicly endorsing a normative 
standard about the kinds of behaviors that are acceptable or unacceptable. The virtue signaler 
wants their audience to use this endorsement as evidence for their character. But in the process, 
they have also told their audience about what they think should be viewed as permissible and 
impermissible, honorable and shameful. From the perspective of an audience member learning 
about the social norms of their ingroup, this is valuable information in and of itself. Indeed, when 
many individuals chime in and make similar public moral statements (piling on, as Tosi and 
Warmke put it), the audience member receives evidence about what many people believe ought 
to be the case. If all these virtue signalers belong to one’s reference network, then this starts to 
look like pretty good evidence for one’s normative expectations – i.e. how one’s peers think 
people ought to behave. And if this widespread virtue signaling rises to the level of public 
shaming or ostracism of the sort that creates real incentives for people to conform to the new 
norm, this will create evidence for one’s empirical expectations about how people will actually 
behave. And so, whatever else it does for the virtue signalers themselves, virtue signaling 
provides evidence about social norms. 
So understood, the potential utility of virtue signaling as a tool for positive norm change 
becomes clear. If a group of influential virtue signalers can be convinced that publicly 
committing to some new normative standard will increase their moral reputations, then they 
stand to play a valuable role in spreading that new norm throughout the broader population. This 
amounts to a three-step process: first, a group of sincere advocates for change seed a new, 
positive normative standard into the public discourse; second, virtue signalers eager to appear 
‘on the side of the angels’ broadcast this new standard to a broader audience through a mix of 
12 
 
positive avowals and public shaming; third, a much larger population treats the behavior of these 
virtue signalers as evidence that they should change their social expectations, and become 
motivated to conform to the new norm.20  
Recent changes in attitudes about the environmental impacts of flying and reductions in 
commercial and private aviation provide us with a case study for how this might work in 
practice. Long known to be significant source of global carbon emissions,21 frequent air-travel 
remains an indicator of social status and a cosmopolitan lifestyle.22 Recently, climate change 
activists have attempted to subvert these attitudes by using both traditional and social media to 
‘flight-shame’ frequent flyers and private jet owners, while also encouraging people to display 
their ‘train-pride’ when adopting environmentally friendly alternatives.23 This new moral 
construal of air-travel has surged into the mainstream in recent years, generating numerous 
articles in the popular press about flight-shaming,24 high-profile flight-shaming incidents,25 and a 
spike in worldwide Google Search traffic over the past five years.26 In a number of countries, this 
movement has also coincided with noticeable decreases in air-travel and corresponding changes 
in attitudes,27 and become a source of considerable anxiety for the aviation industry.28  
 
20 Notably, the same individuals can play multiple roles in this process: at times, sincere advocates for change might 
behave more like virtue signalers, once they become aware of the reputational benefits of their actions; meanwhile, 
virtue signalers might sometimes act as audience members for one another.   
21 Joyce E Penner et al., “IPCC Special Report on Aviation and the Global Atmosphere,” Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Geneva, 1999). 
22 Lisa Oswald and Andreas Ernst, “Flying in the Face of Climate Change: Quantitative Psychological Approach 
Examining the Social Drivers of Individual Air Travel,” Journal of Sustainable Tourism 29, no. 1 (2020): 68–86. 
23 Umair Irfan, “Air Travel Is a Huge Contributor to Climate Change. A New Global Movement Wants You to Be 
Ashamed to Fly,” Vox, 2019. 
24 Ingrid K. Williams, “A Dispatch From the Land of Flight Shaming,” The New York Times, 2019. 
25 Katie Nicholl, “Harry and Meghan Under Fire After Yet Another Private Jet Flight: ‘Frankly It Is Hypocritical,’” 
Vanity Fair, August 2019. 
26 “Topic: Flight Shame,” Google Trends, 2021. 
27 Stefan Gössling, Andreas Humpe, and Thomas Bausch, “Does ‘Flight Shame’ Affect Social Norms? Changing 
Perspectives on the Desirability of Air Travel in Germany,” Journal of Cleaner Production 266 (2020); Elena 
Berton, “Flight Shaming Hits Air Travel as ‘Greta Effect’ Takes Off,” Reuters, 2019. 
28 Ahmed Hagagy, “Aviation Industry to Counter Flight Shaming Movement: IATA Chief,” Reuters, 2019. 
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Alongside its apparent success as an environmentalist campaign, the ‘flight-shaming’ movement 
seems to have shaped the public moral discourse in a very particular way. Before, a jet-setting 
lifestyle might have been viewed as normal or even glamorous; now, these same habits have 
become a reputational liability. Meanwhile, broadcasting one’s own abstention from aviation – 
before, a somewhat puzzling form of ascetic self-denial – has become a way for people to 
enhance their moral reputations in the eyes of their peers. And most importantly, publicly flight-
shaming others suddenly became a way for people to burnish their environmentalist bona fides. 
In effect, the flight-shaming movement seems tailor-made for virtue signaling.  
Not all flight-shaming is virtue signaling, of course. Many of its proponents and earliest 
instigators are no doubt motivated by sincere moral conviction. However, as many philosophers 
have argued, genuine virtue of this sort is probably rare in the population at large: most ordinary 
folk are of decidedly uneven moral character, motivated by a mix of egoistic and moral reasons 
and rarely aiming for more than moral mediocrity.29 It is likely that a number of the people who 
subsequently engaged in flight-shaming were motivated at least in part by reputational 
considerations, which exert subtle, unconscious influence over such acts of moralistic 
punishment.30 But for the purposes of changing social norms, this is a good thing. To instill new 
empirical and normative expectations within a community, a substantial number of people need 
to publicly commit to the new normative standard and start enforcing it upon others, not just the 
most virtuous individuals. Given this end, it makes sense for sincere actors to welcome the 
efforts of virtue signalers in spreading the new norm. By appealing to human beings’ deeply 
 
29 Christian B Miller, Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Eric 
Schwitzgebel, “Aiming for Moral Mediocrity,” Res Philosophica 96, no. 3 (July 2, 2019): 347–68. 
30 Jillian J. Jordan and David G Rand, “Signaling When No One Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of 
Outrage and Punishment In One-Shot Anonymous Interactions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, 
no. 1 (2020): 57–88. 
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engrained disposition to enhance their moral reputations,31  virtue signaling exploits a much 
more effective channel for transmitting social information throughout the broader population 
than appeals to pure virtue ever could.  
For the virtue signalers themselves, reputational considerations can also offset the potential costs 
of adopting and committing to new social norms. Adopting new social norms can mean making 
effortful changes to one’s lifestyle, or else giving up something one normally enjoys. And even 
taking a public stance on an issue can be costly: it risks alienating members of one’s social 
network, and creates the potential for backlash and reprisals.32 Such costs could reasonably deter 
anyone from taking a public moral stand or changing their behavior. Potential reputational gains 
within one’s reference network can offset these costs when raw courage does not suffice. 
Reputational benefits thus provide a motivational boost that can enable an individual to break 
free from the gravitational pull of the status quo. 
6. Virtue signaling and hypocrisy 
At this point, a critic might object that status-seeking only motivates the appearance of virtue, 
and not virtue itself. Because virtue signalers only care about creating the impression that they 
are morally good, they will be motivated to take actions designed to maintain that impression, 
rather than the actions that would actually warrant their neighbors’ high moral esteem. In short, 
the motivations underlying virtue signaling seem to incentivize moral hypocrisy. 
This objection misconstrues the relationship between virtue signaling and changing moral 
behavior. The principal utility of virtue signaling, on my account, is not that it motivates the 
 
31 Dan Sperber and Nicolas Baumard, “Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective,” Mind and 
Language 27, no. 5 (2012): 495–518. 
32 Benoît Monin, Pamela J. Sawyer, and Matthew J. Marquez, “The Rejection of Moral Rebels: Resenting Those 
Who Do the Right Thing,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 1 (2008): 76–93. 
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virtue signalers themselves to adopt new norms (though, as we shall see shortly, it does that as 
well): it is that widespread virtue signaling creates social expectations among members of the 
virtue signaler’s audience, which in turn motivates the adoption of and conformity to social 
norms; when conformity with those norms aligns with one’s moral goals (as in our flight shame 
example), this creates an incentive for moral behavior.  
‘Wait,’ our critic might respond, ‘you said yourself that conformity to social norms depends on 
both normative and empirical expectations. This means that virtue signalers’ behavior really does 
matter. If virtue signalers do not actually conform to the norms they publicly commit to, their 
signaling alone will not be enough to sustain people’s empirical expectations. So as long as 
virtue signaling incentivizes hypocrisy rather than genuine moral commitment, it can’t help 
much with establishing new norms.’ 
It is true that if people do not believe that enough members of their reference network are 
conforming to a norm, they will not conform to it either. But there are a number of forces 
operating within the realm of public moral discourse that push virtue signalers towards behaving 
in line with their claims. Central among these is the charge of hypocrisy itself: if a person very 
obviously fails to practice what they preach, their moral reputation will inevitably suffer, as 
people generally do not think highly of hypocrites.33 We see an elegant example of this 
phenomenon in the ‘This you?’ meme that began to appear on social media feeds during the 
spring of 2020, when the police killing of George Floyd sparked Black Lives Matter protests 
across the United States and around the world. 34 As expressions of support for the Black Lives 
Matter movement spread across the internet, some individuals and corporate entities that tried to 
 
33 Jillian J. Jordan et al., “Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling,” Psychological 
Science 28, no. 3 (2017): 356–68. 
34 Aisha Harris, “‘This You?’ (It Definitely Is),” The New York Times, June 9, 2020. 
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opportunistically virtue signal about their newfound commitment to racial justice were instead 
met with reminders of their own racist behaviors and policies, along with a simple question: 
‘This you?’ Thus, these hypocritical virtue signalers ultimately achieved the opposite of their 
intended goal: instead of enhancing their moral reputations, they were publicly called out and 
held to account. And far from being fooled by their empty gestures, the virtue signalers’ intended 
audience took delight in exposing them as hypocrites. 
This is not to say that hypocrisy is always called out in such a public manner, or that individuals 
do not sometimes get away with empty virtue-signaling. But it does show that hypocritical virtue 
signaling is a risky social strategy, since it is liable to a form of social sanction. Indeed, this 
particular form of social sanction – public shaming – can itself be a form of virtue signaling, a 
way of demonstrating one’s own keen moral instincts. Thus, virtue signalers are not just kept in 
check by their audience, but by each other as well.35  
It is thus implausible to claim that virtue signalers are unlikely to practice what they preach, 
since this kind of behavior would negate whatever reputational benefits the virtue signaler had 
hoped to accrue in the first place. Instead, reputation-seeking motives incentivize morally 
consistent behavior via an indirect route: a person might initially signal commitment to a norm 
out of a desire for enhanced moral reputation, but then feel compelled to live up to this norm 
because their public moral expression has made them publicly accountable.36 
Notably, while public accountability mechanisms incentivize virtue signalers to practice what 
they preach, there is no similar incentive for them to care about what they preach. Even when 
 
35 For a similar point, see Levy, “Virtue Signalling Is Virtuous,” 9. 
36 Brendan Dill and Stephen Darwall, “Moral Psychology as Accountability,” in Moral Psychology and Human 
Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, ed. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 40–83. 
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virtue signalers’ actions are aligned with their moral claims, their underlying attitudes are not, 
which is its own kind of hypocrisy. Virtue signalers would have others believe that they are 
motivated by moral beliefs when they are really acting out of reputational concerns. Since this 
kind of motivation is constitutive of virtue signaling, it would seem to follow that all virtue 
signalers are hypocrites in this sense.37  
However, this kind of hypocrisy is in fact consistent with the kind of moral progress that virtue 
signaling can help us achieve. Because public accountability mechanisms motivate virtue 
signalers to conform to a new norm – however hypocritically – their behavior will provide 
evidence for others’ empirical expectations, which in turn support the diffusion of new positive 
social norms. As long as virtue signalers are held accountable, leading them to practice what they 
preach, they can still contribute to moral progress, even though they are not virtuous themselves. 
7. Virtue signaling and epistemic vigilance 
These worries about hypocrisy also recall one of Tosi and Warmke’s major concerns about the 
negative effects of widespread virtue signaling: its potential to cause widespread cynicism. On 
their account, as people come to suspect that many expressions of moral attitudes are in fact 
disingenuous or self-serving, they will become increasingly skeptical of the moral claims that 
people raise. And when virtue signalers display excessive amounts of moral outrage, this ends up 
lowering the evidential value that such displays normally carry; thus, onlookers can no longer 
use the fact that people are morally outraged about something as a sign that it is a matter of 
significant moral concern. In short, as virtue signaling spreads, so will broader forms of 
 
37 Thanks to one of the editors of this journal for raising this point. 
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skepticism about public moral discourse, which will make it harder for people to learn from one 
another. 
As I have already noted, this argument relies upon an epistemic understanding of how public 
moral discourse produces moral progress: people make arguments about moral issues, which 
cause other people to update their moral beliefs and change their behavior. Until now, my 
argument has focused on highlighting a non-epistemic way that public moral discourse can lead 
to moral progress, and the role that virtue signaling has to play in this process. In doing so, I have 
sidestepped concerns about the epistemic downsides of virtue signaling. But now we are in a 
position to address them. 
As in the case of hypocritical virtue signaling, I suggest that false, inaccurate, or otherwise 
epistemically ill-founded acts of virtue signaling also risk reputational harms. Tosi and Warmke 
argue that reputation-seeking motives lead virtue signalers to try to outdo one another by 
‘ramping up’ the severity of one’s moral claims, each trying to appear more righteous and more 
outraged than the last. A purported consequence of this dynamic is that contributions to moral 
discourse become increasingly disconnected from the truth. But this picture ignores the fact that 
being perceived as reasonable and as a reliable source of information is quite important for one’s 
reputation.38 Being exposed as epistemically unreliable or incoherent would be just as damaging 
for one’s reputation as being exposed as a moral hypocrite, albeit for different reasons: while the 
hypocritical virtue signaler undermines their moral credibility, the unreasonable virtue signaler 
undermines their epistemic credibility. This means that the need to be perceived as reasonable 
will also place plausibility constraints on the content of a person’s virtue signals. As these 
 
38 Sacha Altay, Anne Sophie Hacquin, and Hugo Mercier, “Why Do so Few People Share Fake News? It Hurts 
Their Reputation,” New Media and Society, 2020. 
19 
 
expressions become increasingly extreme or untethered from the communal common ground, 
they will be less effective in achieving their status-seeking ends. 
This idea is reflected in Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning.39 
According to this theory, one of the primary functions of discursive reasoning is to shore up the 
reliability of communication and testimony. From an evolutionary perspective, communication 
offers individuals the opportunity for fitness-enhancing forms of cooperation, but also exposes 
them to the risk of being exploited by free-riders. To protect ourselves from deception and 
misinformation, human beings have developed psychological mechanisms for epistemic 
vigilance, which enable us to monitor the coherence of a person’s testimony and reasoning, and 
to keep track of their overall epistemic reliability. These mechanisms kick into action not when 
we reason in a solitary fashion – in that regard, people are relatively lazy and tend to conserve 
cognitive resources – but when critically evaluating the arguments of others.40 This asymmetry in 
the reasoning process amounts to a form of interactive quality control that enables groups of 
people to reject bad arguments and converge upon sound ones.41 In the process, it forces 
individuals to generate better arguments for their conclusions than they would have on their own. 
Thus, the claim that virtue signaling is unconstrained from the truth ignores the fact that it occurs 
within a discursive ecosystem filled with epistemically vigilant agents, where poor arguments 
and unfounded claims are subject scrutiny. If social comparison motives push virtue signalers to 
‘ramp up’ and make increasingly unwarranted claims, then the presence of vigilant audiences 
 
39 Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, The Enigma of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017); Hugo 
Mercier and Dan Sperber, “Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,” Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 2011. 
40 Emmanuel Trouche et al., “The Selective Laziness of Reasoning,” Cognitive Science 40, no. 8 (2016): 2122–36. 
41 Deanna Kuhn, Victoria Shaw, and Mark Felton, “Effects of Dyadic Interaction on Argumentive Reasoning,” 
Cognition and Instruction 15, no. 3 (1997): 287–315; Emmanuel Trouche, Emmanuel Sander, and Hugo Mercier, 
“Arguments, More than Confidence, Explain the Good Performance of Reasoning Groups,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General 143, no. 5 (2014): 1958–71. 
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serves as a counterweight that forces them to adequately justify those claims. This is not to say 
that such constraints are airtight: a virtue signaler skilled in rhetoric and sophistry could succeed 
in spreading unwarranted moral claims in order to enhance their moral reputation. But like moral 
hypocrisy, this is a risky social strategy. More prudent virtue signalers should be prepared to 
back up their moral claims with plausible arguments, or else they might be dismissed as fools. 
This picture helps to contextualize the cynicism that Tosi and Warmke are worried about: far 
from undermining the integrity of public discourse, the fact that we are disposed to be cynical 
about the claims of others actually ensures that the discursive process as a whole remains 
reliable. A little bit of cynicism keeps virtue signalers on their toes. 
8. Virtue signaling and polarization 
Another worry about the escalatory dynamics of virtue signaling is that it contributes to 
polarization. Out of a desire to outdo one’s peers in the competition to appear morally pure, this 
argument goes, virtue signalers on different sides of a debate are liable to adopt increasingly 
extreme ideological positions, and to engage in ever more severe condemnations of the outgroup, 
both of which undermine the possibility for political compromise.42 One way that others have 
responded to this concern is to point out that there is nothing inherently harmful about this kind 
of moral polarization, and that it is sometimes entirely appropriate. When there are clear and 
compelling moral reasons for adopting a position that is ‘extreme’ relative to the group norm, 
one should adopt it regardless of its extremity. In these cases, it is not polarization that we should 
 
42 Tosi and Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk, 143–53. 
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view with suspicion, but rather the assumption that moral truth lies somewhere in the middle 
ground.43   
However, the biggest concern about polarization does not hinge on the claim that it is necessarily 
bad to be polarized, or that compromise is always the path of virtue. It is rather that intergroup 
polarization exacerbates forms of social bias and motivated reasoning that make us irrational.44 
This argument is consistent with the observation that in certain circumstances, one end of a 
polarized debate might be morally right. The problem is instead that polarized agents invariably 
believe that their side is correct regardless of whether this is really true, and become increasingly 
entrenched in these beliefs despite all counterevidence. To the extent that a particular group 
arrives at the truth via this process, it will be due to mere happenstance, and not because they 
were reasoning in an epistemically sound manner. 
This argument against polarization echoes Tosi and Warmke’s more general concern about the 
unreliability of virtue signaling. In the previous section, I argued that virtue signalers are 
epistemically constrained by the vigilance of their interlocutors and concern for their epistemic 
reputations. However, these sorts of constraints might not be as effective in contexts of 
intergroup polarization. After all, virtue signalers are not necessarily worried about their 
reputations in the population writ large, but rather their reputations within their reference 
networks. Making dubious claims about members of the outgroup might diminish one’s standing 
in their eyes, but this will not matter as long as it improves one’s reputation within the ingroup. 
And when members of their audience engage in politically motivated reasoning, virtue signalers 
are unlikely to face much critical resistance in this regard. If polarization makes people less 
 
43 Levy, “Virtue Signalling Is Virtuous”; Coady, “Philosophy & Public Affairs Discussion at PEA Soup: Justin Tosi 
and Brandon Warmke’s ‘Moral Grandstanding.’”  
44 Tosi and Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk, 74–76. 
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critical in their assimilation of information, this will create conditions where the most 
epistemically harmful forms of virtue signaling might run rampant. 
However, there are at least two ways of cashing out this epistemic worry about polarization, one 
very troubling and one much less so. According to the more troubling version of this picture, 
intergroup contexts like polarization short-circuit our normal rational safeguards, such as 
deliberation, seeking out more information, and habits of critical thinking, instead redeploying 
these processes in the service of rationalizing politically convenient beliefs. If intergroup biases 
corrupt our best defenses against bad reasoning in this way, then polarization really does put us 
in a very bad epistemic position, and should make us skeptical about even our most well-thought 
out moral and political convictions. The less worrisome possibility is that politically motivated 
reasoning is just an ordinary, run-of-the-mill form of sloppy reasoning that afflicts some people 
more than others, and is mitigated by deliberation and critical thinking. In this case, polarization 
might make some people prone to bias, but these biases can be overcome through rational 
scrutiny. This is far less troubling, because it suggests that the epistemic problems associated 
with polarization – while real – are entirely manageable, and not a cause for skepticism.  
Which of these two pictures is correct? While there is some evidence supporting the more 
pessimistic view of polarized agents,45 recent research suggests that on the whole, the more 
mundane picture is probably closer to the truth.46 For example, Bago and colleagues recently 
found that opportunities for deliberation make people better at judging whether or not a headline 
 
45 Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” Judgment and Decision Making 8, 
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is fake news, regardless of whether or not it is concordant with their political views.47 Indeed, 
there is evidence that only a tiny fraction of people actually fall for fake news, partisan biases 
notwithstanding.48 Meanwhile, Mosleh and colleagues found that Twitter users who score higher 
on the Cognitive Reflection Test – a widely used measure of analytic thinking that predicts 
performance on heuristics and biases tasks49 – tend to follow and share posts from more reliable 
sources.50 The same research group has also found that putative effects of cognitive 
sophistication on motivated reasoning are better explained as the effects of priors beliefs about 
the question at hand, a confound ignored by previous studies.51 All this suggests that deliberation 
and critical thinking are not, in fact, corrupted by polarization. This is not to say that politically 
motivated reasoning is not real – just that it does not hobble our best epistemic defenses against 
false information. 
As far as virtue signaling is concerned, the threat of polarization turns out to be a little less 
disturbing than it first appeared. Polarization does not seem to seriously undermine epistemic 
vigilance, at least for more reflective individuals. This means that when a virtue signaler makes 
an implausible but politically convenient claim about the outgroup, whether or not they are 
believed will depend upon whether their audience is disposed towards critical thinking, not just 
their partisan allegiance. Virtue signalers spreading such falsehoods cannot count on their most 
cognitively sophisticated audience members to rationalize their dubious claims. Polarization does 
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not make bad reasoners of us all – it is just one more context where bad reasoners might reveal 
themselves. 
9. From social norms to moral beliefs 
One of the premises of my argument has been that changes in moral belief are often not enough 
to promote moral progress. This claim has rested in part on cases where people persisted in 
immoral practices despite knowing better, because the practice in question was a social norm (as 
in the case of dueling). These are cases where moral beliefs might precede but do not precipitate 
changes in moral behavior. Virtue signaling and norm change offer an alternate, social path to 
achieving these changes. Yet one might worry that the kind of progress achieved by norm change 
is too shallow and precarious to count as genuine moral progress: while conformity to these 
norms might bring people’s behavior in line with principles of right action, these behaviors are 
not themselves motivated by moral reasons. In this section, I address this worry by sketching out 
how prior changes in social norms can precipitate thicker, more robust forms of moral progress. 
Consider again the flight-shaming movement. Suppose that this campaign has been successful, 
and that a flight-shame norm is now in place. People who conform to this norm do not do so 
because they believe that air travel is wrong. They conform to it because they have the empirical 
expectation that others in their reference networks do so as well, and because they believe that 
others in their reference networks think that people ought to conform to it. These are social 
reasons, not moral ones. Here, virtue signaling has made the world a better place, but it has not 
led to any improvements in people’s moral beliefs.  
Once the new norm is in place, however, it can create a set of social conditions where it becomes 
easier for people to bring their moral beliefs in line with their actions, and their actions in line 
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with their moral beliefs. To see how this is possible, consider a world (not unlike the real one) 
where there is no flight-shame norm, but where many people privately believe that air travel has 
bad moral consequences. As we have seen, it might be very difficult for these people to act on 
those moral beliefs. They might feel social pressure to go on that vacation to Rome, or to attend a 
prestigious conference at Oxford. They might want to refuse to go on these trips, but they know 
that doing so would make them seem excessively moralistic and prudish. They might also miss 
out on important social and professional opportunities or damage their personal relationships. In 
this kind of normative environment, acting on their moral beliefs would be quite costly. To 
follow through on one’s moral convictions, one would have to be particularly insensitive to these 
social costs.52  
Now let us return to that other imaginary world where the flight-shaming movement has been 
successful. Here, the costs of acting on one’s environmentalist values are greatly reduced. By 
changing the social norm, we have enabled people to bring their actions in line with their moral 
beliefs without risking ostracism. In this new normative environment, our reluctant flyers now 
have the social freedom to act on their moral convictions. Where previously social pressures 
might have posed a barrier to moral action, now they facilitate it.  
Another effect of the new social norm might be that people who were previously resistant to 
moral arguments against air travel can now become open to them. Before the implementation of 
the new norm, some people exposed to environmentalist arguments against air travel might have 
been strongly motivated to dismiss them, either as a way of maintaining their self-image, or out 
of resistance to the sacrifices that those arguments prescribed. Accordingly, they might have 
 
52 In Norms in the Wild, Bicchieri argues that such individuals, whom she calls ‘trendsetters,’ can play an important 




found ways to rationalize away any moral qualms about their European conference travel: ‘I am 
just one person,’ they might think. ‘My actions cannot possibly make a difference.’ But in the 
new normative environment, people who would have previously resisted moral arguments 
against trans-Atlantic air travel might find themselves more open-minded. The new social norm 
creates a psychological permission structure for these people to change their moral beliefs.  
Finally, consider a child who develops in this new normative environment. This child has never 
had to change their behavior or give anything up to conform to our new norm, since it is all they 
have known. Instead, they have grown up in a community where people avoid excessive air 
travel, where those who do are criticized in moral terms, and where the moral problems with this 
form of transportation can be openly acknowledged. In short, all the social signals this child 
receives will tell them that air travel is morally problematic (even if, deep down, the adults are 
really just conforming to a social norm). This is the kind of developmental context where a child 
might come to internalize flight shame as a genuine moral value, rather than conform to it out of 
mere social pressure.53 Spread out across an entire generation, this developmental process might 
represent a much deeper and wider shift in moral beliefs – albeit one that has lagged a little 
behind an earlier, morally superficial shift in social norms. This scenario represents the 
aspirational goal of any campaign for social change: just as we now intuitively view dueling or 
foot-binding as morally repugnant, those seeking to massively reduce harmful practices like air 
travel or meat eating ultimately hope to make those practices seem unthinkably wrong to future 
generations. But first, they must change the social norms that govern the current generation. 
10. Conclusion 
 
53 For a developmental account of how children come to internalize the norms of their community as objective moral 
obligations, see Tomasello, “The Moral Psychology of Obligation.” 
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Nobody likes to be accused of virtue signaling, and it is normal to find virtue signaling annoying. 
But virtue signaling is not evil, and it is not a great threat to the integrity of public moral 
discourse. It is simply a vehicle for the diffusion of social norms, positive or negative. The worst 
excesses of virtue signaling imagined by its critics are held in check by the vigilance of the virtue 
signaler’s audience, to whom they are socially accountable. Virtue signaling can also be an 
invaluable instrument for social change, especially when moral arguments alone have fallen 
short. Worries about the dangers of virtue signaling are misplaced: we should not see it as a 
dangerous impediment to moral progress, but as a potential asset. 
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Dong An, Kristin Andrews, Jennifer Nagel, Adam Westra, and the 
editors of Philosophy and Public Affairs for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to 
audiences at the University of Toronto and the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology for 
discussion; special thanks to Brendan de Kennessey for ongoing discussions and feedback throughout this 
project. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. 
